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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a model of the market for equity mutual funds that
captures three key characteristics of this market. First, there is competition among
funds. Second, fund managers’ ability is not observed by investors before making
their investment decisions. Third, some investors do not make optimal use of all
available information. The main results of the paper are that 1) price competition
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predictions are supported by available empirical evidence.
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1 Introduction
In 2005, total mutual fund assets in the U.S. were worth 8.9 trillion dollars
and constituted an estimated 20 percent of the total ﬁnancial wealth of U.S.
households (Investment Company Institute 2006). The increasing reliance of
American investors on mutual funds has raised concerns among industry com-
mentators and regulators alike about the extent of competition in the industry
and, in particular, about the level of fees that mutual funds charge investors
for their services. 1 These concerns have prompted regulators to commission
reports (Securities and Exchange Commission 2000, General Accounting Of-
ﬁce 2000) to analyze the evolution and determinants of mutual fund fees.
More recently, a series of scandals 2 have triggered regulatory initiatives that,
among other things, strengthen mutual fund fee disclosure requirements so as
to promote price competition in the industry. 3 Underlying this debate is a
long overdue question: How are fees determined in the mutual fund market?
To address this question, in this paper, we develop a model of the market for
equity mutual funds.
One of the main concerns fueling the debate over mutual fund fees, and a key
motivation for the regulatory changes requiring improved fee disclosure, has
been the degree to which investors are aware of the fees associated with fund
investments and their impact on the return of those investments. A survey by
the SEC and the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency (Alexander et al.
1997) reports that fewer than one in six fund investors understand that higher
fund expenses, which are deducted from the fund’s assets and mostly consist
of management fees, lead to lower returns. The survey also documents that
investors are not familiar with the level of fees they are paying for mutual
fund services (not even 20% of the respondents was able to give an estimate
of the expenses paid for their largest mutual fund) and reveals other gaps in
ﬁnancial literacy. Similar results have been obtained in studies by Capon et
al. (1996) and Wilcox (2003). More recently, a study by Barber et al. (2005)
has provided further evidence of investors’ diﬃculties in understanding the
eﬀects of mutual fund fees. In light of these ﬁndings, it is our view that a
satisfactory model of the mutual fund market should account for the presence
1 For example, in a recent article about the topic in The Economist, one could
read, “Retail investors [...] have seen precious little competition on prices. Even for
wretched performance, reductions in fees have been all too rare” (The Economist
2004).
2 See, for instance, Dwyer et al. (2003) for an account of these scandals.
3 The Securities and Exchange Commission has issued a rule establishing stronger
disclosure requirements for mutual funds (Securities and Exchange Commission
2004). The “Mutual Funds Integrity and Fee Transparency Act of 2003”, which
imposes strict governance and disclosure requirements, passed the U.S. House over-
whelmingly in November, 2003.
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of a signiﬁcant fraction of investors who make less than optimal use of the
information available when making their investment decisions.
The model developed in this paper has three main ingredients, which, we be-
lieve, characterize the market for equity mutual funds. In the U.S., investors
can choose from a large pool of mutual funds, even for relatively narrowly
deﬁned investment categories. Therefore, the ﬁrst ingredient of our model is
competition among (possibly many) funds for investors’ money. This ingre-
dient is key because we would like to know whether existing concerns about
the level of fees charged by mutual funds can still be warranted in the pres-
ence of mutual fund competition. Since our main focus is the market for eq-
uity mutual funds, the second ingredient is quality uncertainty: diﬀerent fund
managers have diﬀerent abilities to generate returns, but those abilities are
not known ex ante by investors. As we argue below, even though in actual
markets, funds’ past returns could be used as a signal of performance, this
signal is, at best, noisy. Therefore, the assumption that quality is not observ-
able appears as a reasonable ﬁrst approximation. The third ingredient is the
presence of a fraction of investors who do not make optimal use of all available
information when making their investment decisions. We label these investors
unsophisticated.
The model enables us to address several questions. 1) Should we expect price
competition among funds to bring equilibrium proﬁts down to zero? 2) Will
high-quality funds drive low-quality funds out of the market? If low-quality
funds manage to survive in equilibrium, 3) will high-quality funds charge
higher fees, so that, in equilibrium, all investors earn the same expected net
returns? If, on the contrary, net returns diﬀer across funds, 4) which funds
will be more likely to overcharge investors: high- or low-quality funds? These
questions lie at the heart of the debate over the extent of competition in the
mutual fund industry and are of key importance in evaluating proposed regu-
latory changes. The model shows that, in equilibrium, 1) funds earn positive
proﬁts, 2) high- and low-quality funds coexist, 3) high-quality funds never
charge higher fees and may charge lower fees, and that, as a consequence, 4)
low-quality funds greatly overcharge investors.
The intuition behind these (perhaps surprising) results is as follows. In the
mutual fund market, the revenues earned by a mutual fund are the product
of its fee and the fund asset value. Therefore, in a setting in which quality
is unobservable, high-quality funds, namely those that deliver a higher value,
may be able to diﬀerentiate themselves by setting low fees. If those fees are low
enough, low-quality funds would not break even by imitating them. Unable to
compete for the sophisticated segment of the market, low-quality funds would
focus instead on extracting rents from unsophisticated investors. It should be
noted that, although the presence of unsophisticated investors is necessary to
obtain this sort of price diﬀerentiation in equilibrium, it is not suﬃcient. The
2
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model’s results follow from the interaction between asymmetric information
and the existence of those investors.
The assumption that fund quality is completely unobservable can seem unreal-
istic if, as indicated by the empirical evidence, past mutual fund returns have
some value as predictors of future performance. The complexity involved in
evaluating and forecasting mutual fund performance, however, suggests that
past returns are only a noisy signal of future performance. The assumption of
asymmetric information is, therefore, still reasonable given that managers pos-
sess skills, technology and access to return-relevant data that investors lack. In
section 4, we investigate the eﬀects of allowing investors to observe a signal of
fund quality prior to making their purchase decision. Our analysis shows that,
as long as the signal is only imperfectly correlated with fund performance,
separating equilibria exist and are like the ones described above.
The available empirical evidence is consistent with our model: funds not only
fail to adjust fees so as to oﬀset diﬀerences in before-fee returns, but on the
contrary, funds of lower quality seem to charge higher fees. Elton et al. (1993),
for instance, document signiﬁcant diﬀerences in after-fee returns across mutual
funds and show that funds that charge higher fees deliver signiﬁcantly lower
before-fee returns. Additional evidence provided by Gruber (1996), Carhart
(1997), Harless and Peterson (1998), and Chevalier and Ellison (1999) has
consistently conﬁrmed the power of high fees to predict underperformance.
Surprisingly, this anomalous pattern in the data has not been explained by
any previous formal model of the mutual fund industry.
Although there exists a relatively large theoretical literature, initiated by
Bhattacharya and Pﬂeiderer (1985), that characterizes the optimal compensa-
tion contract in a delegated portfolio management problem, 4 few studies have
analyzed fund fees as the outcome of the strategic interaction of competing
mutual funds. Recently, Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) have developed a search
model of the market for S&P 500 index funds. In contrast to our paper, how-
ever, they analyze a sector in which ﬁnancial performance diﬀerences across
funds are relatively small and thus focus on non-portfolio fund diﬀerentiation
and search frictions as potential sources of fee dispersion. In another recent
paper, Berk and Green (2004) have proposed a model of the mutual fund mar-
ket with no informational asymmetries or search frictions. The goal of their
model is to explain why money may rationally follow past good performance
even when past performance is not a strong predictor of future performance.
The paper is, however, silent about the determinants of the observed distri-
bution of fees. Das and Sundaram (2002) and Metrick and Zeckhauser (1999)
have analyzed fee setting in a duopoly context with asymmetric information
about fund quality. While Das and Sundaram compare the performance of
4 See, for example, Palomino and Prat (2003) for a recent contribution.
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two types of incentive schemes for fund managers in such a context, the goal
of Metrick and Zeckhauser is to explain why high- and low-quality produc-
ers may charge the same price in certain markets (including the mutual fund
market), and is, thus, closely related to ours. We discuss their results in sec-
tion 2. In another related paper, Nanda et al. (2000) have developed a model
where mutual fund managers of observable quality bear the cost of stochastic
investment redemptions and, therefore, wish to attract investors who are less
likely to experience liquidity needs. In equilibrium, more skilled fund man-
agers impose exit fees and cater to investors with lower liquidity needs, while
less skilled managers become liquidity providers. Finally, Christoﬀersen and
Musto (2002) have explored empirically the eﬀect of investors’ performance
sensitivity on fund fees.
Our paper is also related to the more general literature on the role of prices as
signals of quality. In this literature, high prices generally signal high quality
(e.g., Bagwell and Riordan 1991), although in some contexts involving re-
peated purchases, it has been shown that low introductory prices can be used
as signals of quality (Schmalensee 1978). This set of work, however, has mostly
focused on the case of a single seller of unknown quality. Only recently, Fluet
and Garella (2002) and Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) have studied price
and advertising signaling for the case of a duopoly. In their models, high-
quality ﬁrms charge higher prices in any separating equilibrium. Of related
interest are papers by Gabaix and Laibson (2003, 2006), in which the authors
show that product—or pricing—complexity can allow ﬁrms to obtain positive
mark-ups in equilibrium and that increases in competition may exacerbate the
problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the bench-
mark model, section 3 extends the model to include unsophisticated investors,
section 4 assesses the consequences of the existence of a noisy signal of fund
quality, section 5 discusses the available evidence on the relationship between
performance and fees, and, ﬁnally, section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of Fee Determination in the Market for Mutual Funds
Consider a simple setting in which there is a continuum of investors of mass one
who have one dollar to invest and N mutual fund managers. These managers
can be of one of two types depending on their ability: good (g) and bad
(b). G-managers earn gross expected return Rg, and b-managers Rb, where
Rg > Rb, and Rg > 1. Returns are assumed to be independent of fees, so
we can abstract from moral hazard problems. The ex ante distribution of
types is given by the probability p that a manager is good. Once the types
are realized, fund managers observe their quality but not the quality of their
4
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rivals and decide what fraction e of the fund’s ﬁnal asset value to charge to
investors. The assumption that fees are determined as a fraction of asset value
is made to reﬂect actual practice in the mutual fund industry. In section 5, we
discuss in greater detail the diﬀerent fees paid by mutual fund investors.
Investors do not observe quality, so they decide where to invest on the basis of
the prior distribution and the fees charged by the diﬀerent funds. As argued in
the introduction, even if fund quality could be inferred from diﬀerent sources
of information, such as past returns, evaluating and forecasting mutual fund
performance is a very complex and costly task for retail investors. Fund man-
agers, on the other hand, possess skills, technology and access to data about
their portfolios and organization that investors lack. We therefore believe that
fund managers can be expected to be better informed about their own ability
to generate returns than investors. We discuss this issue in greater detail in
section 4, where we allow investors to be imperfectly informed about fund
quality.
We will assume that a fraction γ of all investors are unsophisticated, in the
sense that they do not make optimal use of all available information. Since we
will ﬁrst analyze the case with no unsophisticated investors, we postpone the
discussion of the precise form in which these investors behave until they are
introduced in section 3.
The costs of managing the fund are cw, where w is the amount of money
managed by the fund manager. It is assumed that costs are low enough to
make it proﬁtable for g-funds to operate if their type is known. We assume
that all market participants are risk-neutral, 5 and that the only alternative
investment is a risk-free asset paying a zero interest rate. Therefore, the max-
imum fee a fund of type k can charge if its type is known is such that the net
return for investors is equal to one: Rk(1−e) = 1, that is e = Rk−1Rk . Therefore,
the assumption that g-funds may proﬁtably operate if their type is known can
be expressed as follows:
5 The risk-neutrality assumption enables us to focus on a single mutual fund char-
acteristic, expected return, so rational investors will always choose the fund with the
highest (after-fee) expected return. We could alternatively drop risk neutrality and
replace expected return with a measure of mutual fund risk-adjusted performance.
A commonly used proxy for risk adjusted-performance is the fund’s alpha, deﬁned
as the fund’s expected return in excess of that implied by the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) or an Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) -type model. Under both
the CAPM and the APT assumptions, investors would prefer funds with higher
(after-fee) alpha.
5
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Assumption 1
Rg − 1
Rg
>
c
Rg
,
where the right-hand side of the inequality is the break-even fee for g-funds.
We also assume that, given c, b-funds may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to operate for
some fee less than one hundred percent:
Assumption 2 Rb > c.
We denote by ek the fee charged by a manager of type k as a proportion of
the value of the fund at the end of the period and assume that there are no
other fees. Therefore, the amount paid by an investor who invests w dollars in
a fund of type k is wekRk, and payoﬀs are w(ekRk − c) for the manager and
w(1− ek)Rk for the investor.
Finally, the timing of decisions is as follows. First, managers simultaneously
set fees. Then investors decide where to invest. We make the assumption that,
if several funds have the same net expected returns, investors allocate their
wealth among them with equal probability.
2.1 Benchmark Case: Complete Information
Before solving the model, it is instructive to investigate the relationship be-
tween fund quality and fees when there are no unsophisticated investors and
quality is observed both by competing funds and by investors. It is straight-
forward to show that, in this case, b-funds will be driven out of the market
whenever there are g-funds:
Proposition 1 With complete information, there do not exist equilibria in
which both fund types operate simultaneously.
Proof. First, note that for both types of funds to have a positive market
share,
(1− eb)Rb = (1− eg)Rg, (1)
which implies that eb < eg.
With complete information the number of funds of each type is given and
commonly known. We study ﬁrst the case in which there is only one g-fund
active and then the case in which there are at least two g-funds. So, suppose
6
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ﬁrst that there is only one g-fund. For b-funds to operate eb ≥ cRb > cRg , which
implies that eg >
c
Rg
. Therefore, if eb ≥ cRb , it would be proﬁtable for the
g-fund to lower eg slightly and attract the whole market. It follows that, in
equilibrium, b-funds cannot operate. The g-fund will set the minimum fee that
guarantees that b-funds do not want to enter, which is given by:
(1− eg)Rg =
(
1− c
Rb
)
Rb. (2)
If there are several g-funds, the same argument applies for any eg >
c
Rg
. The
only possible equilibrium fee is eg =
c
Rg
< c
Rb
, so b-funds remain inactive.
Therefore, good and bad funds cannot coexist in equilibrium with complete
information: whenever it is proﬁtable for b-funds to operate, it is also proﬁtable
for g-funds to lower fees. 6 As a result, b-funds are driven out of the market.
2.2 Asymmetric Information
We now investigate what happens when there is asymmetric information re-
garding funds’ ability to generate returns. To understand the contribution of
the model’s diﬀerent assumptions, we maintain the assumption that there are
no unsophisticated investors. We use the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as our
equilibrium concept and focus only on pure-strategy symmetric equilibria (i.e.,
equilibria in which all funds of the same type play the same pure strategy).
To limit equilibrium multiplicity, we require investors’ out-of-equilibrium be-
liefs to satisfy the property that they do not assign positive probability to
managers setting fees that are certain to yield them a negative proﬁt. That is,
investors cannot assign a positive probability to a fund of type k choosing a
fee less than c
Rk
. Therefore, throughout the paper, by equilibrium we will refer
to a pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium satisfying this restriction on
investors’ beliefs.
First, note that in a separating equilibrium in which both types are ever
active simultaneously, it has to be the case that net returns for investors are
equal across types since, otherwise, investors would not invest with the two
types when both are available. Equality of net returns, in turn, implies that
6 In models of vertical diﬀerentiation (e.g., Shaked and Sutton 1982), equilibria in
which low- and high-quality producers coexist and in which the former charge lower
prices are possible if consumers display diﬀerences in their willingness to pay for
quality. In the mutual fund industry, however, where the good provided by sellers is
end-of-period dollars, one would expect that all consumers have the same willingness
to pay for quality: nobody would pay more cents than anybody else for a dollar.
7
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the expected market shares of g- and b-funds also have to be equal, 7 since
investors are indiﬀerent between both types and, therefore, allocate the money
across funds with equal probability. However, this implies that, if eg > eb, it
would be optimal for b-managers to imitate g-managers. On the other hand,
if eg < eb, no rational investor who observes both fees would invest with a
b-manager. Therefore,
Proposition 2 If all investors react optimally to diﬀerences in expected pay-
oﬀs, there are no separating equilibria in which both fund-types operate simul-
taneously.
According to Proposition 2, we should observe no fee dispersion in equilibrium:
for any realization of the number of b- and g-funds, all the funds with a positive
market share must charge the same fees. Equilibria at which b- and g-funds
are active simultaneously and the latter charge higher fees are not possible.
It is straightforward to show that, with asymmetric information, equilibria
such as the one obtained with complete information, in which only g-funds
are active and make zero proﬁts, are not possible. The reason is that any g-
fund faces a positive probability of competing only against b-funds. Therefore,
there exists a strategy that guarantees positive expected proﬁts to g-funds: set-
ting a fee greater than the break-even fee for g-funds ( c
Rg
), but lower than the
break-even fee for b-funds ( c
Rb
). Such a fee guarantees positive proﬁts if the
fund is ever able to attract any money and, as long as it is not too high, en-
sures that the fund would attract investors’ money at least when there are no
competing g-funds. The fact that g-funds have a strategy that guarantees pos-
itive expected proﬁts immediately rules out Bertrand-like equilibria, such as
the one that results from complete information. It is possible to show, though,
that, for a broad range of parameter values, there are equilibria in which both
types of funds are active, set the same fee, and obtain positive proﬁts. With
complete information, equilibria with positive proﬁts are not possible. If there
is asymmetric information, however, undercutting other funds’ fees can be
interpreted by investors as a signal of low quality, so that, if investors are
suﬃciently pessimistic in their assessment of deviating funds, equilibria with
positive proﬁts can arise. 8
We would like to note here that the existence of an equilibrium at which funds
of diﬀerent qualities set the same fee has already been proposed by Metrick
and Zeckhauser, although in a very diﬀerent context. They study a vertically-
diﬀerentiated duopoly characterized by sequential price setting (with good
funds setting fees, front-end loads, before bad funds) and by investor hetero-
7 The expectation is taken over the possible realizations of the number of b- and
g-funds.
8 We omit the proof of the existence of this type of equilibrium, since it can be
obtained as a special case of the pooling equilibria analyzed in the next section.
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geneity along two dimensions: on the one hand, diﬀerent investors value the
“good” provided by mutual funds diﬀerently, and on the other hand, some
investors can observe quality while others cannot. In this context, an equi-
librium in which both funds set the same price can arise when the qualities
are similar enough. The reason is that competition for the investors who can
observe quality is strong in this case. As a result, the good fund may ﬁnd it
optimal to set a fee low enough to force bad funds out of the informed segment
of the market. It is important to note that, in their model, good funds attract
more money than bad funds in a pooling equilibrium, since the latter do not
get any money from informed investors. It is also worth noting that, in their
model, there are also separating equilibria in which both funds are active and
good funds charge higher fees. In our model, these equilibria are not possible.
3 Unsophisticated Investors
In the introduction, we argued that a satisfactory model of the mutual fund
industry should account for the empirical evidence that a signiﬁcant fraction
of investors do not make optimal use of all available information when making
their investment decisions. For example, in a survey conducted by Capon et
al. (1996), more than 70% of respondents did not know whether their mutual
funds invested mainly in domestic or international stocks, or whether they
invested mainly in equity or ﬁxed income. Especially notable is investors’
ignorance of the fees charged by their mutual funds. In particular, a survey
commissioned by the SEC and the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency
(Alexander et al. 1997) shows that 81.2 % of respondents could not give an
estimate of the expenses of the largest fund they owned and, of those investors,
only 43% claimed to have known their largest fund’s expenses at the time they
ﬁrst invested in the fund. Investors’ ignorance of management fees is consistent
with the importance that they assign to these fees when determining their
investment choices: Capon et al. report that the mean importance given by
individual investors to management fees as a selection criterion is 2.28 in a
scale from 1 to 6, and Wilcox ﬁnds similar results when inferring investors’
selection criteria from actual choices. If investors weight any fees at all, they
consider load fees and not management fees (Barber et al.).
Investors’ insensitivity to management fees may reﬂect the lack of salience of
these fees (Barber et al.): management fees are paid over time, are calculated
as a fraction of the value of the investment, and are, therefore, hard to trans-
late into (discounted) dollar terms. Further, since expenses are typically in the
range of 1-2%, some investors may underestimate the long run eﬀects of ap-
parently small diﬀerences in expenses or code as equal expenses with diﬀerent
long run eﬀects. The problem of processability of information on mutual fund
expense ratios is stressed by Cox and Payne (2005), who apply Slovic’s (1972)
9
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concreteness principle to argue that investors tend to accept the information
on fees in the format it is given rather than expend cognitive eﬀort to trans-
form it, thus providing a justiﬁcation to the SEC’s new rule requiring funds
to disclose expenses in dollar terms. However, Cox and Payne also argue that
these disclosure requirements may not be suﬃcient and that management fees
will be underweighted in decisions unless they are expressed relative to those
of comparable funds.
The evidence, thus, shows that the behavior of a large fraction of investors is
markedly diﬀerent from that of the sophisticated investors we considered in
the previous section, who not only knew the fees charged by all funds, but
rightly understood in equilibrium the relation between fees and expected per-
formance. In this section, in addition to sophisticated investors, we include
a fraction of investors whose investment choices are largely unresponsive to
fees. More speciﬁcally, we assume that the probability of an unsophisticated
investor investing in a given mutual fund is the same for all funds and inde-
pendent of the fee charged by the fund as long as that fee is below a threshold
value eU . This threshold reﬂects the fact that, even though investors may not
be fully aware of the exact value of fees or of their implications for net re-
turns when they lie within a reasonable range, they would detect fees that are
conspicuously high. We take a conservative approach and assume that this
threshold is relatively low and given by:
R(1− eU) = 1,
where R = pRg + (1 − p)Rb is the expected gross return given the ex ante
distribution of fund types. That is, unsophisticated investors invest only if the
expected net return, given the distribution of fund types, is at least as high as
that of the alternative asset. Arguably, this requirement demands too much
sophistication from unsophisticated investors. As we discuss below, however,
our results do not depend on the speciﬁc choice of eU and are consistent
with both higher and lower values of this parameter. Finally, we assume that
unsophisticated investors do not infer any information about a fund’s quality
from the fee it charges. Again, we could somewhat relax this assumption.
However, as we argue below, we do not think that doing this would increase
the realism of our assumptions and would unnecessarily complicate the results.
To derive the market equilibrium when there is a fraction γ of unsophisticated
investors, note ﬁrst that a reasoning similar to Proposition 2 still applies in
this case: in equilibrium, b-managers and g-managers cannot both serve the
sophisticated market segment and charge diﬀerent fees. If eg > eb, b-managers
would mimic g-managers’ pricing strategy. If eg < eb, sophisticated investors
would not invest in b-funds. Therefore, if the presence of unsophisticated in-
vestors allows for the existence of separating equilibria in which both fund
types are active simultaneously, sophisticated investors must prefer one type
10
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of fund over the other. The possibility that b-funds oﬀer a higher net return
in equilibrium can be ruled out, since it is straightforward to show that there
cannot exist separating equilibria in which g-funds serve only unsophisticated
investors and b-funds serve sophisticated investors. Therefore, we investigate
next whether there can exist separating equilibria in which both fund types
are active simultaneously and in which b-funds serve only unsophisticated in-
vestors as long as there are competing g-funds. Obviously, for these equilibria
to exist, b-funds must be able at least to break even by charging eU since,
otherwise, they would never be active.
Assumption 3 eU >
c
Rb
.
The following conditions must hold at this type of equilibrium:
wUg (Rgeg − c) ≥ wUb (Rgeb − c) (NIg)
wUb (Rbeb − c) ≥ wUg (Rbeg − c) (NIb)
wUb (Rbeb − c) ≥ 0, (Pb)
where wUk is the wealth that a fund setting ek expects to obtain conditional
on all other funds playing the equilibrium strategies. Note that eg < eb im-
plies that if b-funds serve any sophisticated investors at all, they will do so
only when there are no g-funds in the market, whereas g-funds serve sophis-
ticated investors with probability one. Since all funds get the same share of
unsophisticated investors’ money, it follows that wUg > w
U
b .
The ﬁrst two conditions above are no-imitation constraints for g- and b-funds,
respectively, and the last condition is a participation constraint for b-funds.
A participation constraint for g-funds is not necessary because it is implied
by (NIb) and (Pb). Note that since wUg > w
U
b , condition (NIb) requires that
eg < eb; in this type of equilibrium, g-funds must set lower fees.
Fees also have to be low enough to convince both sophisticated and unsophis-
ticated investors to participate:
eg ≤ Rg − 1
Rg
(3)
eb ≤ eU (4)
Finally, it cannot be proﬁtable for b- or g-funds to deviate and set an out-of-
equilibrium fee. To evaluate these deviations, we need to make assumptions
about sophisticated investors’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs. To prove the results
below, we assume that sophisticated investors interpret any deviation from
equilibrium as coming from a b-fund unless it yields negative proﬁts for such
a fund. These extreme beliefs are chosen to simplify the proofs and are not
necessary. For our results to hold, all that is required is that sophisticated
11
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investors assign a suﬃciently high probability to a deviator being of low qual-
ity. The next proposition shows that there are parameter values such that all
the above conditions hold simultaneously and there are no proﬁtable out-of-
equilibrium deviations (proofs can be found in the appendix).
Proposition 3 There exist separating equilibria with unsophisticated investors
at which:
(1) b-funds serve unsophisticated investors only and charge e∗b = eU ,
(2) g-funds charge e∗g >
c
Rb
and serve both sophisticated and unsophisticated
investors,
(3) e∗b > e
∗
g.
Figures A.1 and A.2 show that separating equilibria of this sort can exist for
reasonable parameter values. For each possible value of γ (plotted along the
x-axis), the ﬁgures graph the minimum and maximum values of c (plotted
along the y-axis) for which these equilibria can exist.
The equilibria described in Proposition 3 are the only possible separating
equilibria, but there may also exist pooling equilibria for certain parameter
values. At these pooling equilibria, g- and b-funds set the same fee, and both
types make positive proﬁts.
Proposition 4 For some parameter values, there exist pooling equilibria in
which both types set ep >
c
Rb
.
Given the complexity of the conditions that deﬁne both the pooling and the
separating equilibria, we have not attempted to ascertain which type of equi-
librium holds for a greater range of parameter values or investors’ beliefs. As
we did above for the case of separating equilibria, we have numerically found
the range of values of c and γ consistent with the existence of a pooling equi-
libria for the case in which p = 1
2
. Figures A.3 and A.4 show that pooling
equilibria can also exist for reasonable parameter values.
Inspection of propositions 3 and 4 seems to indicate that quality is not re-
warded in the market for mutual funds since g-funds charge fees that are
lower or equal to those charged by b-funds. Quality is, however, rewarded
by higher proﬁts: at any equilibrium, g-funds obtain higher proﬁts than b-
funds. At a separating equilibrium, the no-imitation constraint (NIg), ensures
that wUg (Rgeg − c) ≥ wUb (Rgeb − c), which, since Rg > Rb, implies that
wUg (Rgeg − c) > wUb (Rbeb − c). At a pooling equilibrium, all funds charge
the same fee, ep and get the same market share. The fact that Rg > Rb im-
mediately implies that 1
N
(Rgep − c) > 1N (Rbep − c).
The model in this section departs from the benchmark complete information
model in two dimensions, and it is instructive to see how each of these di-
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mensions contributes to the existence of separating equilibria such as the ones
described in Proposition 3. First, the existence of unsophisticated investors al-
lows b-funds to survive while setting fees that diﬀer from those of g-funds. As
we saw in the previous section, this would not be possible if all investors held
correct beliefs in equilibrium and could move their money freely. In this re-
spect, our model resembles models of price dispersion based on the presence of
search costs (like Salop and Stiglitz 1977), where impediments to search allow
ﬁrms charging higher prices to obtain positive market shares. Second, the pres-
ence of asymmetric information limits the competitive pressure on g-funds. If
sophisticated investors could observe fund quality, competition among g-funds
would drive eg down to
c
Rg
, but such a situation could not be an equilibrium
with unsophisticated investors, because g-funds can set a higher fee, sell to
unsophisticated investors and make a positive proﬁt. It should thus be em-
phasized that the existence of unsophisticated investors alone cannot generate
separating equilibria with both fund types active.
In light of Proposition 3, it is worth reevaluating whether our characterization
of unsophisticated investors implies that these investors behave in a way that
would be considered unreasonable even for investors such as those described
by the survey evidence discussed at the beginning of this section. A possible
concern is that
eU >
Rb − 1
Rb
,
where Rb−1
Rb
is the fee that guarantees the reservation return when investing
with a b-fund. Therefore, at a separating equilibrium, some unsophisticated
investors (those paired with b-funds) would do better by investing in the
reservation asset. We do not think that this requires too much unsophistication
from investors for two reasons. First, unsophisticated investors earn an average
return at least as high as that of the alternative asset, since a fraction p
of unsophisticated investors are paired with g-funds. The average return for
unsophisticated investors is
p(1− e∗g)Rg + (1− p)(1− eU )Rb > p(1− eU)Rg + (1− p)(1− eU)Rb =
= (1− eU)(pRg + (1− p)Rb) = (1− eU)R = 1. (5)
The second reason is that most studies agree that the average actively managed
mutual fund has historically delivered below market returns, at least after
expenses and transaction costs are deducted (see, e.g., Wermers 2000). In this
sense, our model would seem to require too much (rather than too little)
sophistication from investors.
Another possible concern relates to the assumption that unsophisticated in-
vestors do not update their beliefs about funds’ quality based on the fees
charged by those funds. Given that, in a separating equilibrium, good and
13
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bad funds set diﬀerent fees, one may wonder whether separating equilibria
such as the ones described above could survive. There are again two reasons
why we are not especially worried by this concern. The ﬁrst reason is theoret-
ical. Although we have assumed that eU is the maximum fee that an investor
would like to pay for a fund of average quality, the proof of Proposition 3
shows that a separating equilibrium can exist as long as eU > 1− 1Rb , that is,
as long as the maximum fee that unsophisticated investors are willing to pay
is greater than the maximum fee a sophisticated investor would be willing to
pay for a low-quality fund. Therefore, as long as unsophisticated investors do
not fully update their beliefs (i.e., if they do not believe that a fund setting
eU is bad with probability one), separating equilibria can exist. The second
reason is empirical. As we discuss in section 5, a negative relation between
expenses and performance has been extensively documented. In the survey re-
ported by Alexander et al., however, about 20 percent of respondents believed
that mutual funds with higher expenses produced better results, 64.4 percent
believed that funds with higher expenses produced average results, and only
15.7 percent of the survey respondents believed that higher expenses led to
lower-than-average returns. Since the negative relationship between fees and
performance had been already identiﬁed by several studies before the survey
was conducted, the survey shows that a signiﬁcant fraction of investors had
not optimally updated their beliefs. Further, investors’ money, and not just
investors’ opinion, seems to show that a sizeable number of them are not mak-
ing the right investment choices. As Martin Gruber put it, we see that money
remains in funds that can be predicted to do poorly and that, in fact, do
perform poorly (p. 807).
4 Noisy Performance Signals
Throughout the article, we have assumed that while fund managers knew
their expected performance, the only information available to investors prior
to their investment decision was contained in the fees charged by mutual
fund managers. If funds diﬀer in their ability to generate returns, however, we
should expect past returns to convey some information about fund quality.
Therefore, we would like to know if our results are robust to the existence of a
noisy signal of fund quality. Further, if past returns were accurate predictors of
future performance, the very assumption of asymmetric information could be
put into question, so it is important to know to what extent future performance
can be predicted on the basis of information about past returns.
The empirical evidence shows that signiﬁcant underperformance is a reason-
ably good predictor of future underperformance. In other words, there seems
to exist performance persistence for worst-performing funds. The existence of
persistence at the top, however, remains a hotly debated issue. Grinblatt and
14
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Titman (1992) and Hendricks et al. (1993), among others, ﬁnd that previous
years’ winners and losers tend to repeat (this is known as the “hot hand”
phenomenon). Carhart, however, questions these ﬁndings, explaining the pre-
viously documented persistence of top performers in terms of survivorship bias
and the momentum anomaly in the stock market. More recent evidence (see,
for instance, Bollen and Busse, 2005), however, shows that there is some per-
formance persistence at the top, although this persistence is short lived (not
longer than a quarter).
Two conclusions can be drawn from this evidence. First, information on past
returns has some predictive value, although this predictive value is limited and,
second, as evidenced by the lack of consensus in the literature, the problem
of predicting future performance on the basis of past returns is very complex
and requires advanced ﬁnancial and quantitative skills. Taken together, these
conclusions imply that for individual investors, past returns will be, at best, a
noisy signal of performance. The limited information conveyed by past returns
also implies that managers may be better informed than investors. In other
words, the observed performance persistence is compatible with the existence
of asymmetric information. Moreover, although the fact that fund managers
may be better informed than investors does not justify assuming that they will,
in fact, be better informed, we believe that one should expect fund managers
to have a better assessment than investors about their expected performance.
The reason is twofold. First, fund managers are likely to possess more advanced
ﬁnancial skills and better research tools than individual investors. Second, and
most importantly, fund managers have access to return-relevant information
not available to investors. For instance, managers continuously observe the
composition of the portfolio they manage, while investors can observe only the
fund’s portfolio composition at some pre-speciﬁed moments throughout the
year. Fund managers also observe each trade they make and the transaction
costs associated with each of those trades. Further, managers are likely to
have a better idea of their skills, the skills of their staﬀ, and the quality of
their research tools. In particular, fund managers can assess the accuracy of
their own forecasts and, thus, assess whether fund results are due to their
investment strategy or to luck. Finally, fund managers are better informed
than investors about the likelihood of future changes in the fund’s staﬀ (in
particular, the probability of their own departure from the management team)
or investment strategy.
In our view, the limited value that past returns have for investors as pre-
dictors of future performance justiﬁes making the simplifying approximation
that there is, in fact, no information available to them other than fund fees. To
check the robustness of our results, however, we next extend the model to allow
investors to observe a noisy signal of performance before making their invest-
ment decision. In the interest of brevity, we do not analyze pooling equilibria
and focus strictly on whether the results obtained in the previous section con-
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cerning the relationship between fees and fund quality at separating equilibria
still hold when there is a noisy signal of performance.
Suppose that after funds set fees, investors observe a noisy signal σ of fund
quality, which can take two values, l or h (low or high). Conditional on the
fund’s type, σ is i.i.d. across funds with a probability distribution given by
Pr(l|b) = Pr(h|g) = ν > 1/2. Therefore,
Pr(g|h) = pν
pν + (1− p)(1− ν) ≡ h > p, (6)
Pr(g|l) = p(1− ν)
p(1− ν) + (1− p)ν ≡ l < p. (7)
That is, upon observing h the probability of a fund being g is h > p, and,
upon observing l the probability of a fund being g is l < p. The higher ν, the
higher h and the lower l and, thus, the higher the precision of the signal.
While sophisticated investors will optimally condition their investment de-
cision on performance signals and fees, the response of unsophisticated in-
vestors to the presence of a performance signal is less clear a priori. On the
one hand, unsophisticated investors may not respond, or respond too little,
to the signal if they do not observe it or underestimate the amount of in-
formation carried by it. On the other hand, unsophisticated investors may
overreact to the signal if they overestimate its precision. To capture the whole
possible range of behavior by unsophisticated investors we assume that the
fraction of the wealth of unsophisticated investors that a fund with a value
j (j = l, h) for the signal expects to obtain is given by a function fj of the
other funds’ signals. By varying this function we can account for any degree
of responsiveness to the signal by unsophisticated investors. For example, as-
suming that N = 2, if unsophisticated investors do not respond to the signal,
then fh(σh) = fh(σl) = fl(σh) = fl(σl) =
1
2
(where the argument of the
function in each case is the realization of the other fund’s signal). If unso-
phisticated investors’ investment choice is fully determined by the signal, then
fh(σh) = fl(σl) =
1
2
, fh(σl) = 1, and fl(σh) = 0.
Independently of how unsophisticated investors respond to the signal, it is still
the case that if there exist separating equilibria, then worse-performing funds
charge higher fees since at a separating equilibrium, fees are perfect signals of
fund quality, while σ is only a noisy signal. Therefore, sophisticated investors
will optimally disregard the signal and infer quality from the fee alone. As in
previous sections, it follows that if eg > eb, then it would be proﬁtable for
b-funds to imitate g-funds. Therefore, at any separating equilibrium, eg < eb.
To check whether separating equilibria such as the ones described in Propo-
sition 3 exist in the presence of a signal of fund quality, suppose ﬁrst that
unsophisticated investors disregard the signal σ. In this case, it is straight-
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forward to check that the conditions that guarantee existence of a separating
equilibrium are exactly identical to the ones derived in the absence of σ.
To analyze the case in which unsophisticated investors condition their invest-
ment decision on the signal, let sk denote the money that a fund of type k
expects to obtain from sophisticated investors at a separating equilibrium and
uk the money that it expects to obtain from unsophisticated investors. With
these deﬁnitions, we can write the no-imitation conditions at a separating
equilibrium as follows:
(sg + ug)(Rgeg − c) ≥ ug(RgeU − c), (NIg”)
ub(RbeU − c) ≥ (sg + ub)(Rbeg − c), (NIb”)
where the ﬁrst condition ensures that g-funds do not want to set eU , and the
second one ensures that b-funds do not want to pass as g-funds. In both con-
ditions, the money that a fund setting eU expects to obtain from sophisticated
investors at a separating equilibrium is zero, since eU >
Rb−1
Rb
. Note now that
if P (h|g) = ν > 1 − ν = Pr(h|b), then ug > ub, since a fund with σ = h will
obtain more money from unsophisticated investors in expectation than a fund
with σ = l, and g-funds are more likely to have a high signal.
To characterize fully a separating equilibrium, we need to check the two no-
imitation conditions above, participation constraints for b-funds and sophisti-
cated investors, and constraints that ensure that funds do not want to deviate
to a fee that is not played in equilibrium (that is, a fee other than eg or eU).
These conditions are analogous to the ones derived in the absence of a signal,
so we do not rewrite them here. Figures A.5, A.6, and A.7 display the range of
parameter values for which separating equilibria exist for the case N = 2 and
for diﬀerent values of ν, fl and fh.
9 Figure A.5 displays the range of values of
c and γ for which separating equilibria exist when the signal is only slightly
informative about the fund’s type. In particular, ν is chosen to be 0.55. In
each ﬁgure, we consider three diﬀerent cases. First, unsophisticated investors
ignore the signal; that is, fh(σh) = fl(σl) = fh(σl) = fl(σh) = 0.5. In this
case, represented by the thick solid line, separating equilibria are identical to
the ones in the absence of a signal (since unsophisticated investors are equally
likely to invest with either fund). Second, unsophisticated investors are more
likely to invest in a fund with high signal if the other fund has low signal. In
particular, the thin solid line represents the parameter set compatible with
equilibrium when fh(σl) = 0.8 and fl(σh) = 0.2. Finally (dashed lines), we
consider the case in which, if the funds have diﬀerent signals, unsophisticated
9 Note that in the ﬁgures, Rb < 1. This assumption greatly simpliﬁes the com-
putation of the equilibrium conditions and is empirically accurate: sophisticated
investors would never invest with bad actively managed funds if they knew their
quality. The authors would be glad to provide the program used to derive the ﬁgures
upon request.
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investors invest only in the fund with a high signal: fh(σl) = 1 and fl(σh) = 0.
As one could have expected, the range of parameters for which a separating
equilibrium exists shrinks as unsophisticated investors become more likely to
invest with funds with a high value of the signal and as the precision of the
signal increases, although the reduction is not severe.
Figures A.6 and A.7 show what happens as we increase the precision of the
signal to ν = 0.7 and ν = 0.9, respectively. 10 The ﬁgures show that separating
equilibria still exist for reasonable parameter values in the limit, that is, as the
signal becomes extremely precise, even if the investment decision of unsophis-
ticated investors is completely determined by the signal. We can, therefore,
conclude that the results derived in the previous section are largely robust
to the presence of a noisy signal of performance. It should be noted that if
ν = 0.50, so that the signal is not truly informative, then separating equilibria
would be identical to those derived in the absence of a signal, independently
of the degree to which unsophisticated investors are aﬀected by the signal.
It is worth noting that one could, alternatively, assume that σ is observed by
funds and investors before funds set their fees. This alternative assumption
would allow us to model not just how investors react to noisy performance
information, but also how funds strategically respond to information about
their own and other funds’ performance. The problem with this assumption
is that if the signals became public before funds set fees, a fund’s decision
would have to be made contingent not only on its quality and the value of its
signal, but also on the complete proﬁle of other funds’ signals, which greatly
complicates the analysis. Further, fund expenses are empirically much more
persistent than performance, and recent evidence shows that the fees charged
for the management of a given fund are only rarely changed (Kuhnen 2004).
This evidence suggests that not much is lost, and much is won in terms of
tractability by assuming that fees are set prior to observing the performance
signal.
10 Given the empirical literature on performance persistence, ν = 0.55 is a plausible
value for the precision of the signal and ν = 0.7 can be considered as an upper
bound for this precision. The value ν = 0.9 is analyzed as a limiting case.
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5 Evidence on the Relationship between Performance and Fees
5.1 Mutual Fund Fee Structure
In the market for mutual funds, the fees paid by investors take two forms: pe-
riodic fees (operating expenses) and one-time fees (loads). 11 Expenses mostly
consist of management fees, but also include 12b-1 (distribution and market-
ing) fees, custody fees, and administrative fees, as well as operating, legal, and
accounting costs. They are computed as a percentage of assets under manage-
ment (termed the expense ratio) and are deducted on a daily basis from the
fund’s net assets by the managing company. Fees paid to brokers in the course
of the fund’s trading activity are not included in the fund’s expense ratio.
Loads are generally used to pay distributors, and they diﬀer from operating
expenses in that they are paid by the individual investor as a fraction of
the amount invested at the time of purchasing fund shares (sales charge on
purchases) or redeeming fund shares (deferred sales charge). Since fund returns
are typically computed from the fund’s net asset value, quoted returns are net-
of-expenses, but before loads.
5.2 Empirical Evidence
The quality of an actively managed fund is commonly deﬁned as the manager’s
ability to deliver returns above those that any investor could obtain following a
passive strategy, such as investing in an index fund. Diﬀerences in managerial
quality could translate into diﬀerences in after-expense returns if quality were
not fully priced. If higher quality were partly priced (that is, if better funds
charged higher expenses) diﬀerences in after-expense returns would be smaller
than diﬀerences in fees. On the other hand, if high-quality funds happened to
charge lower fees, diﬀerences in after-expense returns would be greater than
diﬀerences in fees.
Elton et al. divide a sample of U.S. mutual funds available in the 1965-84 pe-
riod into quintiles by expense ratios and measure average after-expense risk-
adjusted returns 12 for funds in each quintile. They ﬁnd that funds with higher
11 Mahoney (2004) provides a review of mutual fund fee practices and regulation. For
a more detailed description, we suggest that the reader visit the Online Publications
section of the SEC internet site.
12 In particular, they measure performance as the intercept term from the regression
of annual returns on three indexes, tracking the evolution of stocks in the S&P 500
index, non-S&P stocks, and bonds. This measure of performance can be interpreted
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expense ratios perform signiﬁcantly worse, and that performance diﬀerences
between funds in the best and the worst quintiles exceed diﬀerences in fees,
which suggests that funds with higher expenses exhibit lower before-expense
returns. Put diﬀerently, low-quality funds seem to be more expensive. Gru-
ber studies cross-sectional diﬀerences in after-fee performance in the 1985-94
period and ﬁnds similar results. 13
Harless and Peterson analyze data employed in early performance studies and
ﬁnd that the predictive power of expense ratios with respect to performance
also extends to the 1954-64 period. They conclude that “all the studies show
that funds with the lowest expense ratios tend to perform best, and funds
with highest expense ratios tend to perform worst” (p. 262).
Carhart proposes a diﬀerent measure of performance. 14 When regressing this
performance measure on expense ratios, he estimates that in the 1962-93 pe-
riod funds with annual expenses of 100 basis points above the average had on
average 154 basis points below mean after-expense performance. Again, the
eﬀect of fees is to amplify rather than mitigate diﬀerences in before-expense
performance.
Finally, Chevalier and Ellison, using a measure of performance similar to
Carhart’s, report that manager and fund characteristics (such as the port-
folio turnover ratio and log of assets) contribute to explaining diﬀerences in
performance in the 1988-95 period. When controlling for these variables, they
provide estimates of the eﬀect on after-expense performance of a 100 basis
point reduction in expense ratios that range from 152 to 225 basis points.
Otten and Bams (2002) and Bechmann and Rangvid (2007) have recently re-
ported evidence of a negative relation between expenses and fund performance
in several European countries.
Put together, the empirical evidence implies that superior management is not
priced through higher expense ratios. On the contrary, it appears that the
eﬀect of expenses on after-expense performance (even after controlling for
funds’ observable characteristics) is more than one-to-one, which would imply
that low-quality funds charge higher fees. Price and quality thus seem to be
inversely related in the market for actively managed mutual funds.
as the value added by the fund manager with respect to a passive strategy.
13 Gruber analyzes three alternative proxies for performance: (i) the fund’s average
return relative to the market, (ii) the fund’s average return in excess of the fund’s
expected return according to the Capital Asset Pricing Model, and (iii) the fund’s
average excess return according to a four-index model.
14 Carhart employs a four-factor model that captures the fund’s exposure to sources
of undiversiﬁable risk.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that in the mutual fund industry, better-quality
funds should not be expected to charge higher prices. Moreover, investors’
limited ability to evaluate fund quality may lead to equilibria in which worse-
performing funds charge higher fees. We thus obtain a form of inverse price
diﬀerentiation that is consistent with existing evidence on mutual fund per-
formance.
The fundamental role played by mutual funds and the current demands for
regulatory action call for further analysis of the mutual fund industry. Our
model suggests several directions for future research. In particular, a richer
model of mutual fund competition should capture a wider set of strategic
choices by mutual fund managers. For instance, while we have taken fund
quality as exogenous, mutual fund management companies may, to some ex-
tent, set the quality of the funds they oﬀer through their choice of managers
or their expenditure in market analysis.
Also, funds might try to diﬀerentiate themselves through their marketing deci-
sions. One could expect that old-enough funds with a good performance record
could advertise that performance record to attract unsophisticated investors.
Moreover, the theoretical literature in industrial organization oﬀers additional
rationales for the existence of informative advertising (for a recent review of
the literature, see Bagwell 2007). In the context of the mutual fund sector,
however, our conjecture is that advertising could well be associated with lower
rather than with higher quality. In particular, it may not be diﬃcult for low-
quality funds to advertise on the basis of some measure of performance (such
as short term risk-unadjusted returns). Moreover, it is not clear that it is in
the interest of better funds to advertise. The reason is that while unsophisti-
cated investors are likely to respond to advertising, sophisticated investors can
be expected to be insensitive to advertising, since they can obtain and pro-
cess publicly available information about fund performance. Therefore, funds
catering only to the unsophisticated segment might want to advertise in order
to gain market share in that sector, while better funds might avoid advertising
precisely to distinguish themselves from bad funds. Consistently with this rea-
soning, Gallaher et al. (2006, table 8) have recently found that mutual funds
with better performance do not have larger advertising expenditures, and, for
some types of funds, larger advertising expenditures are associated with lower
performance.
Although in this paper we have speciﬁcally modelled the market for mutual
funds, the insights of the model may be generalizable to other markets where
quality assessment is costly. The existing empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between quality and price suggests that the correlation between these two
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variables is typically not strongly positive and that in a signiﬁcant number of
markets, the correlation is indeed negative (e.g., Caves and Greene 1996). In
our model, the negative correlation between price and quality results from
the combination of asymmetric information about product quality and the
presence of a subset of unsophisticated investors. Future work may further
explore, both theoretically and empirically, how these and other factors aﬀect
observed price-quality correlations.
Our results indicate that the complexity associated with the evaluation of
fund quality may, on the one hand, weaken competition, leading to high av-
erage fees even in the presence of a large pool of competing mutual funds,
and, on the other hand, lead to a segmented market in which a fraction of
investors pay higher than average fees for underperforming funds. Whether
this state of things could be improved by regulation and what the optimal
form of this regulation is are questions that merit further scrutiny. Currently,
both the SEC and NASD, the self-regulatory arm of the U.S. securities indus-
try, impose limits on redemption fees and the loads that can be charged to
mutual fund investors to pay for brokerage services. Further research is, how-
ever, required to assess the potential eﬀects of similar limits to mutual fund
expenses. For example, if there were economies of scale in fund management,
regulatory pressure to reduce fees could disproportionately aﬀect young, small
funds. This could have an adverse impact on competition in the sector by re-
stricting entry. A less contentious alternative, already having been pursued by
the SEC, is to require that funds improve the disclosure of their fees to allow
investors to realize the dollar cost of the expenses paid. The SEC, however,
has stopped short of requiring funds to disclose periodically to each investor
the exact dollar amount of the expenses paid on the grounds that such a re-
quirement would impose large processing costs on mutual fund companies.
Given the large potential costs that a poor understanding of the impact of
fees on returns has for unsophisticated investors, our model would suggest
reevaluating this cost-beneﬁt analysis. Our model also suggests that requiring
funds to disclose the level of fees charged by the fund compared to the average
or median fees in the corresponding investment category, information that is
already voluntarily disclosed by some mutual fund management companies,
could greatly contribute to prevent funds from overcharging unsophisticated
investors.
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Fig. A.1. Conditions for Existence of Separating Equilibria with Unsophisticated
Investors. Rb = 1.1; Rg = 1.3; p = 0.5; N=2. The x-axis displays values of γ, while
c is displayed along the y-axis. The curves represent the minimum and maximum
values of c such that a separating equilibrium exists for each γ.
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Fig. A.2. Conditions for Existence of Separating Equilibria with Unsophisticated
Investors. Rb = 1.1; Rg = 1.3; p = 0.5; N=5. The x-axis displays values of γ, while
c is displayed along the y-axis. The curves represent the minimum and maximum
values of c such that a separating equilibrium exists for each γ.
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Fig. A.3. Conditions for Existence of Pooling Equilibria with Unsophisticated In-
vestors. Rb = 1.1; Rg = 1.3; p = 0.5; N=2. The x-axis displays values of γ, while
c is displayed along the y-axis. The curves represent the minimum and maximum
values of c such that a pooling equilibrium exists for each γ.
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Fig. A.4. Conditions for Existence of Pooling Equilibria with Unsophisticated In-
vestors. Rb = 1.1; Rg = 1.3; p = 0.5; N=5. The x-axis displays values of γ, while
c is displayed along the y-axis. The curves represent the minimum and maximum
values of c such that a pooling equilibrium exists for each γ.
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Fig. A.5. Conditions for Existence of Separating Equilibria with Unsophisticated
Investors. Rb = 0.9; Rg = 1.3; p = 0.5; ν = 0.55; N = 2. The x-axis displays
values of γ, while c is displayed along the y-axis. The curves represent the minimum
and maximum values of c such that a separating equilibrium exists for each γ. We
have considered three possible reactions of unsophisticated investors to observed
diﬀerences in quality signals: (i) fh(σl) = fl(σh) = 12 ; (ii) fh(σl) = 0.8, fl(σh) = 0.2;
and (iii) fh(σl) = 1, fl(σh) = 0. In all cases fh(σh) = fl(σl) = 12 . Situations (i)-(iii)
are represented by thick solid lines, thin solid lines and dashed lines, respectively.
Note that the lines may overlap, so that only the thick solid line is visible.
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Fig. A.6. Conditions for Existence of Separating Equilibria with Unsophisticated
Investors. Rb = 0.9; Rg = 1.3; p = 0.5; ν = 0.7; N = 2. The x-axis displays
values of γ, while c is displayed along the y-axis. The curves represent the minimum
and maximum values of c such that a separating equilibrium exists for each γ. We
have considered three possible reactions of unsophisticated investors to observed
diﬀerences in quality signals: (i) fh(σl) = fl(σh) = 12 ; (ii) fh(σl) = 0.8, fl(σh) = 0.2;
and (iii) fh(σl) = 1, fl(σh) = 0. In all cases fh(σh) = fl(σl) = 12 . Situations (i)-(iii)
are represented by thick solid lines, thin solid lines and dashed lines, respectively.
29
Page 31 of 31
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
Fig. A.7. Conditions for Existence of Separating Equilibria with Unsophisticated
Investors. Rb = 0.9; Rg = 1.3; p = 0.5; ν = 0.9; N = 2. The x-axis displays
values of γ, while c is displayed along the y-axis. The curves represent the minimum
and maximum values of c such that a separating equilibrium exists for each γ. We
have considered three possible reactions of unsophisticated investors to observed
diﬀerences in quality signals: (i) fh(σl) = fl(σh) = 12 ; (ii) fh(σl) = 0.8, fl(σh) = 0.2;
and (iii) fh(σl) = 1, fl(σh) = 0. In all cases fh(σh) = fl(σl) = 12 . Situations (i)-(iii)
are represented by thick solid lines, thin solid lines and dashed lines, respectively.
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